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designated authority identifies subjects who will fall under the scope of
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the regulation. However, unlike telecom law, which charges national
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regulatory authorities, enforcement is centralized on the European
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Commission. Besides, differently from competition law, the Commission
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imposes remedies on them in advance and not after long and lengthy
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antitrust procedures. For that, the Commission was granted significant
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legal powers for enforcing the obligations.
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Commission. The Commission can investigate (Art. 16) whether a company
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should be designated as a gatekeeper and its compliance, as well as update
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the list of obligations. The Commission can also impose fines up to 10% of
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the gatekeeper's yearly turnover or periodic penalty payments up to 5% of
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the average daily worldwide turnover (Arts. 30-31).
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</p>
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<p>
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End-users, competitors and other organisations can collaborate in the enforcement
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of the DMA by informing national regulatory authorities about illegal practices
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by gatekeepers. The regulators can communicate the Commission to start proceedings.
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</p>
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<figure class="no-border">
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<img
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src="https://pics.fsfe.org/uploads/medium/6b5043bde262be066db2e6e8f24e7814.png"
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@@ -247,60 +254,19 @@
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</figcaption>
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</figure>
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<p>
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Companies falling under the quantitative thresholds of gatekeeper
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designation criteria (Art. 3(2)) should automatically notify the
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Commission, which will identify the services and products that will
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be regulated. The Commission can also conduct an investigation and
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designate further companies as gatekeepers that meet the qualitative
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criteria of Art. 3(1).
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</p>
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<p>
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Gatekeepers should provide audit reports to the Commission on the measures
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implemented within 6 months after their designation (Art. 11(1)). The DMA
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contains anti-circumvention provisions in Art. 13(4) forbidding
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gatekeepers to engage in behaviour that undermines the effective
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implementation of the obligations.
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</p>
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<p>
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The DMA provides the EC with a market investigation tool (Art. 16) to
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examine whether a company should be designated as a gatekeeper, to
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investigate non-compliance by gatekeepers, and to update the list of
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services and the obligations. In case of non-compliance, the gatekeepers
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the possibility to offer commitments to end further proceedings. The
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Commission can impose fines up to 10% of the yearly turnover and, in case
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of systematic non-compliance, refusal to give information, etc. periodic
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penalty payments up to 5% of the average daily worldwide turnover (Arts.
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30-31).
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</p>
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<p>
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An important element for private enforcement is located in Art. 27 which
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grants any third party (including business, end-users and competitors) the
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ability to inform the regulatory national authority about any gatekeeper
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practice or behaviour that falls within the DMA’s scope.
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</p>
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<h2 id="dma-concerns-fs">DMA's implementation and Free Software</h2>
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<p>
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The monopolistic power of large tech corporations causes distortions on
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digital markets affecting negatively end-users’ rights and control over
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devices. User freedoms relating to Free Software depends on a political
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User freedoms relating to Free Software depends on a political
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and economic environment in which they can exercise their free choice
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when using their devices without being stuck in closed environments under
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control of gatekeepers. Digital markets will benefit with DMA regulating
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control of gatekeepers. Digital markets can benefit with DMA regulating
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the commercial practices of large platforms, forcing them to facilitate
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access to Free Software in devices. Device Neutrality translates in the
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DMA as stricter consent rules for pre-installed apps, safeguards against
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vendor lock-in, and data portability. The right for end-users to use their
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own device and operating system is an important factor to guarantee access
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of Free Software operating systems to dominant platforms. As a daily
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reality for many users, this option enlarges the audience for Free Software
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adoption. However, the future holds challenges for the practical
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implementation of the DMA rules and ultimately Device Neutrality.
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access to Free Software in devices. Nevertheless, the DMA still falls short
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in some aspects involving Open Standards, the pressure gatekeepers can exercise
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over decision makers and complex digital enviroments.
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</p>
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<figure class="no-border">
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