635 lines
36 KiB
Plaintext
635 lines
36 KiB
Plaintext
Lima, 8th of April, 2002
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To: Señor JUAN ALBERTO GONZÁLEZ
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General Manager of Microsoft Perù
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Dear Sir:
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First of all, I thank you for your letter of March 25, 2002 in which
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you state the official position of Microsoft relative to Bill Number
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1609, Free Software in Public Administration, which is indubitably
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inspired by the desire for Peru to find a suitable place in the global
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technological context. In the same spirit, and convinced that we will
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find the best solutions through an exchange of clear and open ideas, I
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will take this opportunity to reply to the commentaries included in
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your letter.
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While acknowledging that opinions such as yours constitute a
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significant contribution, it would have been even more worthwhile for
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me if, rather than formulating objections of a general nature (which
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we will analyze in detail later) you had gathered solid arguments for
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the advantages that proprietary software could bring to the Peruvian
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State, and to its citizens in general, since this would have allowed a
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more enlightening exchange in respect of each of our positions.
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With the aim of creating an orderly debate, we will assume that what
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you call "open source software" is what the Bill defines as "free
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software", since there exists software for which the source code is
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distributed together with the program, but which does not fall within
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the definition established by the Bill; and that what you call
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"commercial software" is what the Bill defines as "proprietary" or
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"unfree", given that there exists free software which is sold in the
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market for a price like any other good or service.
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It is also necessary to make it clear that the aim of the Bill we are
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discussing is not directly related to the amount of direct savings
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that can by made by using free software in state institutions. That is
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in any case a marginal aggregate value, but in no way is it the chief
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focus of the Bill. The basic principles which inspire the Bill are
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linked to the basic guarantees of a state of law, such as:
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* Free access to public information by the citizen.
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* Permanence of public data.
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* Security of the State and citizens.
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To guarantee the free access of citizens to public information, it is
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indispensable that the encoding of data is not tied to a single
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provider. The use of standard and open formats gives a guarantee of
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this free access, if necessary through the creation of compatible free
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software.
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To guarantee the permanence of public data, it is necessary that the
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usability and maintenance of the software does not depend on the
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goodwill of the suppliers, or on the monopoly conditions imposed by
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them. For this reason the State needs systems the development of which
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can be guaranteed due to the availability of the source code.
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To guarantee national security or the security of the State, it is
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indispensable to be able to rely on systems without elements which
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allow control from a distance or the undesired transmission of
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information to third parties. Systems with source code freely
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accessible to the public are required to allow their inspection by the
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State itself, by the citizens, and by a large number of independent
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experts throughout the world. Our proposal brings further security,
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since the knowledge of the source code will eliminate the growing
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number of programs with *spy code*.
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In the same way, our proposal strengthens the security of the
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citizens, both in their role as legitimate owners of information
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managed by the state, and in their role as consumers. In this second
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case, by allowing the growth of a widespread availability of free
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software not containing *spy code* able to put at risk privacy and
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individual freedoms.
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In this sense, the Bill is limited to establishing the conditions
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under which the state bodies will obtain software in the future, that
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is, in a way compatible with these basic principles.
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From reading the Bill it will be clear that once passed:
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# the law does not forbid the production of proprietary software
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# the law does not forbid the sale of proprietary software
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# the law does not specify which concrete software to use
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# the law does not dictate the supplier from whom software
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will be bought
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# the law does not limit the terms under which a software product
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can be licensed.
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What the Bill does express clearly, is that, for software to be
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acceptable for the state it is not enough that it is technically
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capable of fulfilling a task, but that further the contractual
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conditions must satisfy a series of requirements regarding the
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license, without which the State cannot guarantee the citizen adequate
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processing of his data, watching over its integrity, confidentiality,
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and accessibility throughout time, as these are very critical aspects
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for its normal functioning.
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We agree, Mr. Gonzalez, that information and communication technology
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have a significant impact on the quality of life of the citizens
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(whether it be positive or negative). We surely also agree that the
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basic values I have pointed out above are fundamental in a democratic
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state like Peru. So we are very interested to know of any other way of
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guaranteeing these principles, other than through the use of free
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software in the terms defined by the Bill.
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As for the observations you have made, we will now go on to analyze
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them in detail:
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Firstly, you point out that: "1. The bill makes it compulsory for all
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public bodies to use only free software, that is to say open source
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software, which breaches the principles of equality before the law,
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that of non-discrimination and the right of free private enterprise,
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freedom of industry and of contract, protected by the constitution."
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This understanding is in error. The Bill in no way affects the rights
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you list; it limits itself entirely to establishing conditions for the
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use of software on the part of state institutions, without in any way
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meddling in private sector transactions. It is a well established
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principle that the State does not enjoy the wide spectrum of
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contractual freedom of the private sector, as it is limited in its
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actions precisely by the requirement for transparency of public acts;
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and in this sense, the preservation of the greater common interest
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must prevail when legislating on the matter.
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The Bill protects equality under the law, since no natural or legal
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person is excluded from the right of offering these goods to the State
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under the conditions defined in the Bill and without more limitations
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than those established by the Law of State Contracts and Purchasing
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(T.U.O. by Supreme Decree No. 012-2001-PCM).
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The Bill does not introduce any discrimination whatever, since it only
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establishes *how* the goods have to be provided (which is a state
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power) and not *who* has to provide them (which would effectively be
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discriminatory, if restrictions based on national origin, race
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religion, ideology, sexual preference etc. were imposed). On the
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contrary, the Bill is decidedly antidiscriminatory. This is so because
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by defining with no room for doubt the conditions for the provision of
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software, it prevents state bodies from using software which has a
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license including discriminatory conditions.
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It should be obvious from the preceding two paragraphs that the Bill
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does not harm free private enterprise, since the latter can always
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choose under what conditions it will produce software; some of these
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will be acceptable to the State, and others will not be since they
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contradict the guarantee of the basic principles listed above. This
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free initiative is of course compatible with the freedom of industry
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and freedom of contract (in the limited form in which the State can
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exercise the latter). Any private subject can produce software under
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the conditions which the State requires, or can refrain from doing
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so. Nobody is forced to adopt a model of production, but if they wish
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to provide software to the State, they must provide the mechanisms
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which guarantee the basic principles, and which are those described in
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the Bill.
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By way of an example: nothing in the text of the Bill would prevent
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your company offering the State bodies an office "suite", under the
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conditions defined in the Bill and setting the price that you consider
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satisfactory. If you did not, it would not be due to restrictions
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imposed by the law, but to business decisions relative to the method
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of commercializing your products, decisions with which the State is
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not involved.
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To continue; you note that:" 2. The bill, by making the use of open
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source software compulsory, would establish discriminatory and non
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competitive practices in the contracting and purchasing by public
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bodies..."
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This statement is just a reiteration of the previous one, and so the
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response can be found above. However, let us concern ourselves for a
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moment with your comment regarding "non-competitive ... practices."
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Of course, in defining any kind of purchase, the buyer sets conditions
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which relate to the proposed use of the good or service. From the
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start, this excludes certain manufacturers from the possibility of
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competing, but does not exclude them "a priori", but rather based on a
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series of principles determined by the autonomous will of the
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purchaser, and so the process takes place in conformance with the
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law. And in the Bill it is established that *no one* is excluded from
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competing as far as he guarantees the fulfillment of the basic
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principles.
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Furthermore, the Bill *stimulates* competition, since it tends to
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generate a supply of software with better conditions of usability, and
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to better existing work, in a model of continuous improvement.
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On the other hand, the central aspect of competivity is the chance to
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provide better choices to the consumer. Now, it is impossible to
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ignore the fact that marketing does not play a neutral role when the
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product is offered on the market (since accepting the opposite would
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lead one to suppose that firms' expenses in marketing lack any sense),
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and that therefore a significant expense under this heading can
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influence the decisions of the purchaser. This influence of marketing
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is in large measure reduced by the bill that we are backing, since the
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choice within the framework proposed is based on the *technical
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merits* of the product and not on the effort put into
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commercialization by the producer; in this sense, competitiveness is
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increased, since the smallest software producer can compete on equal
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terms with the most powerful corporations.
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It is necessary to stress that there is no position more
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anti-competitive than that of the big software producers, which
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frequently abuse their dominant position, since in innumerable cases
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they propose as a solution to problems raised by users: "update your
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software to the new version" (at the user's expense, naturally);
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furthermore, it is common to find arbitrary cessation of technical
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help for products, which, in the provider's judgment alone, are "old";
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and so, to receive any kind of technical assistance, the user finds
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himself forced to migrate to new versions (with non-trivial costs,
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especially as changes in hardware platform are often involved). And as
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the whole infrastructure is based on proprietary data formats, the
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user stays "trapped" in the need to continue using products from the
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same supplier, or to make the huge effort to change to another
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environment (probably also proprietary).
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You add: "3. So, by compelling the State to favor a business model
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based entirely on open source, the bill would only discourage the
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local and international manufacturing companies, which are the ones
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which really undertake important expenditures, create a significant
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number of direct and indirect jobs, as well as contributing to the
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GNP, as opposed to a model of open source software which tends to have
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an ever weaker economic impact, since it mainly creates jobs in the
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service sector."
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I do not agree with your statement. Partly because of what you
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yourself point out in paragraph 6 of your letter, regarding the
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relative weight of services in the context of software use. This
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contradiction alone would invalidate your position. The service model,
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adopted by a large number of companies in the software industry, is
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much larger in economic terms, and with a tendency to increase, than
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the licensing of programs.
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On the other hand, the private sector of the economy has the widest
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possible freedom to choose the economic model which best suits its
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interests, even if this freedom of choice is often obscured
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subliminally by the disproportionate expenditure on marketing by the
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producers of proprietary software.
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In addition, a reading of your opinion would lead to the conclusion
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that the State market is crucial and essential for the proprietary
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software industry, to such a point that the choice made by the State
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in this bill would completely eliminate the market for these firms. If
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that is true, we can deduce that the State must be subsidizing the
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proprietary software industry. In the unlikely event that this were
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true, the State would have the right to apply the subsidies in the
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area it considered of greatest social value; it is undeniable, in this
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improbable hypothesis, that if the State decided to subsidize
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software, it would have to do so choosing the free over the
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proprietary, considering its social effect and the rational use of
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taxpayers money.
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In respect of the jobs generated by proprietary software in countries
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like ours, these mainly concern technical tasks of little aggregate
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value; at the local level, the technicians who provide support for
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proprietary software produced by transnational companies do not have
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the possibility of fixing bugs, not necessarily for lack of technical
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capability or of talent, but because they do not have access to the
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source code to fix it. With free software one creates more technically
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qualified employment and a framework of free competence where success
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is only tied to the ability to offer good technical support and
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quality of service, one stimulates the market, and one increases the
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shared fund of knowledge, opening up alternatives to generate services
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of greater total value and a higher quality level, to the benefit of
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all involved: producers, service organizations, and consumers.
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It is a common phenomenon in developing countries that local software
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industries obtain the majority of their takings in the service sector,
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or in the creation of "ad hoc" software. Therefore, any negative
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impact that the application of the Bill might have in this sector will
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be more than compensated by a growth in demand for services (as long
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as these are carried out to high quality standards). If the
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transnational software companies decide not to compete under these new
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rules of the game, it is likely that they will undergo some decrease
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in takings in terms of payment for licenses; however, considering that
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these firms continue to allege that much of the software used by the
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State has been illegally copied, one can see that the impact will not
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be very serious. Certainly, in any case their fortune will be
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determined by market laws, changes in which cannot be avoided; many
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firms traditionally associated with proprietary software have already
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set out on the road (supported by copious expense) of providing
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services associated with free software, which shows that the models
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are not mutually exclusive.
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With this bill the State is deciding that it needs to preserve certain
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fundamental values. And it is deciding this based on its sovereign
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power, without affecting any of the constitutional guarantees. If
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these values could be guaranteed without having to choose a particular
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economic model, the effects of the law would be even more
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beneficial. In any case, it should be clear that the State does not
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choose an economic model; if it happens that there only exists one
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economic model capable of providing software which provides the basic
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guarantee of these principles, this is because of historical
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circumstances, not because of an arbitrary choice of a given model.
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Your letter continues: "4. The bill imposes the use of open source
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software without considering the dangers that this can bring from the
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point of view of security, guarantee, and possible violation of the
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intellectual property rights of third parties."
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Alluding in an abstract way to "the dangers this can bring", without
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specifically mentioning a single one of these supposed dangers, shows
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at the least some lack of knowledge of the topic. So, allow me to
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enlighten you on these points.
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On security:
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National security has already been mentioned in general terms in the
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initial discussion of the basic principles of the bill. In more
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specific terms, relative to the security of the software itself, it is
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well known that all software (whether proprietary or free) contains
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errors or "bugs" (in programmers' slang). But it is also well known
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that the bugs in free software are fewer, and are fixed much more
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quickly, than in proprietary software. It is not in vain that numerous
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public bodies responsible for the IT security of state systems in
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developed countries require the use of free software for the same
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conditions of security and efficiency.
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What is impossible to prove is that proprietary software is more
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secure than free, without the public and open inspection of the
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scientific community and users in general. This demonstration is
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impossible because the model of proprietary software itself prevents
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this analysis, so that any guarantee of security is based only on
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promises of good intentions (biased, by any reckoning) made by the
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producer itself, or its contractors.
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It should be remembered that in many cases, the licensing conditions
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include Non-Disclosure clauses which prevent the user from publicly
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revealing security flaws found in the licensed proprietary product.
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In respect of the guarantee:
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As you know perfectly well, or could find out by reading the "End User
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License Agreement" of the products you license, in the great majority
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of cases the guarantees are limited to replacement of the storage
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medium in case of defects, but in no case is compensation given for
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direct or indirect damages, loss of profits, etc... If as a result of
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a security bug in one of your products, not fixed in time by
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yourselves, an attacker managed to compromise crucial State systems,
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what guarantees, reparations and compensation would your company make
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in accordance with your licensing conditions? The guarantees of
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proprietary software, inasmuch as programs are delivered ``AS IS'',
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that is, in the state in which they are, with no additional
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responsibility of the provider in respect of function, in no way
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differ from those normal with free software.
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On Intellectual Property:
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Questions of intellectual property fall outside the scope of this
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bill, since they are covered by specific other laws. The model of free
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software in no way implies ignorance of these laws, and in fact the
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great majority of free software is covered by copyright. In reality,
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the inclusion of this question in your observations shows your
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confusion in respect of the legal framework in which free software is
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developed. The inclusion of the intellectual property of others in
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works claimed as one's own is not a practice that has been noted in
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the free software community; whereas, unfortunately, it has been in
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the area of proprietary software. As an example, the condemnation by
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the Commercial Court of Nanterre, France, on 27th September 2001 of
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Microsoft Corp. to a penalty of 3 million francs in damages and
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interest, for violation of intellectual property (piracy, to use the
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unfortunate term that your firm commonly uses in its publicity).
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You go on to say that: "The bill uses the concept of open source
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software incorrectly, since it does not necessarily imply that the
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software is free or of zero cost, and so arrives at mistaken
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conclusions regarding State savings, with no cost-benefit analysis to
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validate its position."
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This observation is wrong; in principle, freedom and lack of cost are
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orthogonal concepts: there is software which is proprietary and
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charged for (for example, MS Office), software which is proprietary
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and free of charge (MS Internet Explorer), software which is free and
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charged for (Red Hat, SuSE etc GNU/Linux distributions), software
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which is free and not charged for (Apache, Open Office, Mozilla), and
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even software which can be licensed in a range of combinations
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(MySQL).
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Certainly free software is not necessarily free of charge. And the
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text of the bill does not state that it has to be so, as you will have
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noted after reading it. The definitions included in the Bill state
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clearly *what* should be considered free software, at no point
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referring to freedom from charges. Although the possibility of savings
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in payments for proprietary software licenses are mentioned, the
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foundations of the bill clearly refer to the fundamental guarantees to
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be preserved and to the stimulus to local technological
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development. Given that a democratic State must support these
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principles, it has no other choice than to use software with publicly
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available source code, and to exchange information only in standard
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formats.
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If the State does not use software with these characteristics, it will
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be weakening basic republican principles. Luckily, free software also
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implies lower total costs; however, even given the hypothesis (easily
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disproved) that it was more expensive than proprietary software, the
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simple existence of an effective free software tool for a particular
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IT function would oblige the State to use it; not by command of this
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Bill, but because of the basic principles we enumerated at the start,
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and which arise from the very essence of the lawful democratic State.
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You continue: "6. It is wrong to think that Open Source Software is
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free of charge. Research by the Gartner Group (an important
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investigator of the technological market recognized at world level)
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has shown that the cost of purchase of software (operating system and
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applications) is only 8% of the total cost which firms and
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institutions take on for a rational and truly beneficial use of the
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technology. The other 92% consists of: installation costs, enabling,
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support, maintenance, administration, and down-time."
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This argument repeats that already given in paragraph 5 and partly
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contradicts paragraph 3. For the sake of brevity we refer to the
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comments on those paragraphs. However, allow me to point out that your
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conclusion is logically false: even if according to Gartner Group the
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cost of software is on average only 8% of the total cost of use, this
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does not in any way deny the existence of software which is free of
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charge, that is, with a licensing cost of zero.
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In addition, in this paragraph you correctly point out that the
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service components and losses due to down-time make up the largest
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part of the total cost of software use, which, as you will note,
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contradicts your statement regarding the small value of services
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suggested in paragraph 3. Now the use of free software contributes
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significantly to reduce the remaining life-cycle costs. This reduction
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in the costs of installation, support etc. can be noted in several
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areas: in the first place, the competitive service model of free
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software, support and maintenance for which can be freely contracted
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out to a range of suppliers competing on the grounds of quality and
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low cost. This is true for installation, enabling, and support, and in
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large part for maintenance. In the second place, due to the
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reproductive characteristics of the model, maintenance carried out for
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an application is easily replicable, without incurring large costs
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(that is, without paying more than once for the same thing) since
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modifications, if one wishes, can be incorporated in the common fund
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of knowledge. Thirdly, the huge costs caused by non-functioning
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software ("blue screens of death", malicious code such as virus,
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worms, and trojans, exceptions, general protection faults and other
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well-known problems) are reduced considerably by using more stable
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software; and it is well known that one of the most notable virtues of
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free software is its stability.
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You further state that: "7. One of the arguments behind the bill is
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the supposed freedom from costs of open-source software, compared with
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the costs of commercial software, without taking into account the fact
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that there exist types of volume licensing which can be highly
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|
advantageous for the State, as has happened in other countries."
|
|
|
|
I have already pointed out that what is in question is not the cost of
|
|
the software but the principles of freedom of information,
|
|
accessibility, and security. These arguments have been covered
|
|
extensively in the preceding paragraphs to which I would refer you.
|
|
|
|
On the other hand, there certainly exist types of volume licensing
|
|
(although unfortunately proprietary software does not satisfy the
|
|
basic principles). But as you correctly pointed out in the immediately
|
|
preceding paragraph of your letter, they only manage to reduce the
|
|
impact of a component which makes up no more than 8% of the total.
|
|
|
|
You continue: "8. In addition, the alternative adopted by the bill (I)
|
|
is clearly more expensive, due to the high costs of software
|
|
migration, and (II) puts at risk compatibility and interoperability of
|
|
the IT platforms within the State, and between the State and the
|
|
private sector, given the hundreds of versions of open source software
|
|
on the market."
|
|
|
|
Let us analyze your statement in two parts. Your first argument, that
|
|
migration implies high costs, is in reality an argument in favor of
|
|
the Bill. Because the more time goes by, the more difficult migration
|
|
to another technology will become; and at the same time, the security
|
|
risks associated with proprietary software will continue to
|
|
increase. In this way, the use of proprietary systems and formats will
|
|
make the State ever more dependent on specific suppliers. Once a
|
|
policy of using free software has been established (which certainly,
|
|
does imply some cost) then on the contrary migration from one system
|
|
to another becomes very simple, since all data is stored in open
|
|
formats. On the other hand, migration to an free software context
|
|
implies no more costs than migration between two different proprietary
|
|
software contexts, which invalidates your argument completely.
|
|
|
|
The second argument refers to "problems in interoperability of the IT
|
|
platforms within the State, and between the State and the private
|
|
sector" This statement implies a certain lack of knowledge of the way
|
|
in which free software is built, which does not maximize the
|
|
dependence of the user on a particular platform, as normally happens
|
|
in the realm of proprietary software. Even when there are multiple
|
|
free software distributions, and numerous programs which can be used
|
|
for the same function, interoperability is guaranteed as much by the
|
|
use of standard formats, as required by the bill, as by the
|
|
possibility of creating interoperable software given the availability
|
|
of the source code.
|
|
|
|
You then say that: "9. The majority of open source code does not offer
|
|
adequate levels of service nor the guarantee from recognized
|
|
manufacturers of high productivity on the part of the users, which has
|
|
led various public organizations to retract their decision to go with
|
|
an open source software solution and to use commercial software in its
|
|
place."
|
|
|
|
This observation is without foundation. In respect of the guarantee,
|
|
your argument was rebutted in the response to paragraph 4. In respect
|
|
of support services, it is possible to use free software without them
|
|
(just as also happens with proprietary software), but anyone who does
|
|
need them can obtain support separately, whether from local firms or
|
|
from international corporations, again just as in the case of
|
|
proprietary software.
|
|
|
|
On the other hand, it would contribute greatly to our analysis if you
|
|
could inform us about free software projects *established* in public
|
|
bodies which have already been abandoned in favor of proprietary
|
|
software. We know of a good number of cases where the opposite has
|
|
taken place, but not know of any where what you describe has taken
|
|
place.
|
|
|
|
You continue by observing that: "10. The bill discourages the
|
|
creativity of the Peruvian software industry, which invoices 40
|
|
million US$/year, exports 4 million US$ (10th in ranking among
|
|
non-traditional exports, more than handicrafts) and is a source of
|
|
highly qualified employment. With a law that encourages the use of
|
|
open source, software programmers lose their intellectual property
|
|
rights and their main source of payment."
|
|
|
|
It is clear enough that nobody is forced to commercialize their code
|
|
as free software. The only thing to take into account is that if it is
|
|
not free software, it cannot be sold to the public sector. This is not
|
|
in any case the main market for the national software industry. We
|
|
covered some questions referring to the influence of the Bill on the
|
|
generation of employment which would be both highly technically
|
|
qualified and in better conditions for competition above, so it seems
|
|
unnecessary to insist on this point.
|
|
|
|
What follows in your statement is incorrect. On the one hand, no
|
|
author of free software loses his intellectual property rights, unless
|
|
he expressly wishes to place his work in the public domain. The free
|
|
software movement has always been very respectful of intellectual
|
|
property, and has generated widespread public recognition of its
|
|
authors. Names like those of Richard Stallman, Linus Torvalds, Guido
|
|
van Rossum, Larry Wall, Miguel de Icaza, Andrew Tridgell, Theo de
|
|
Raadt, Andrea Arcangeli, Bruce Perens, Darren Reed, Alan Cox, Eric
|
|
Raymond, and many others, are recognized world-wide for their
|
|
contributions to the development of software that is used today by
|
|
millions of people throughout the world. On the other hand, to say
|
|
that the rewards for authors rights make up the main source of payment
|
|
of Peruvian programmers is in any case a guess, in particular since
|
|
there is no proof to this effect, nor a demonstration of how the use
|
|
of free software by the State would influence these payments.
|
|
|
|
You go on to say that: "11. Open source software, since it can be
|
|
distributed without charge, does not allow the generation of income
|
|
for its developers through exports. In this way, the multiplier effect
|
|
of the sale of software to other countries is weakened, and so in turn
|
|
is the growth of the industry, while Government rules ought on the
|
|
contrary to stimulate local industry."
|
|
|
|
This statement shows once again complete ignorance of the mechanisms
|
|
of and market for free software. It tries to claim that the market of
|
|
sale of non- exclusive rights for use (sale of licenses) is the only
|
|
possible one for the software industry, when you yourself pointed out
|
|
several paragraphs above that it is not even the most important
|
|
one. The incentives that the bill offers for the growth of a supply of
|
|
better qualified professionals, together with the increase in
|
|
experience that working on a large scale with free software within the
|
|
State will bring for Peruvian technicians, will place them in a highly
|
|
competitive position to offer their services abroad.
|
|
|
|
You then state that: "12. In the Forum, the use of open source
|
|
software in education was discussed, without mentioning the complete
|
|
collapse of this initiative in a country like Mexico, where precisely
|
|
the State employees who founded the project now state that open source
|
|
software did not make it possible to offer a learning experience to
|
|
pupils in the schools, did not take into account the capability at a
|
|
national level to give adequate support to the platform, and that the
|
|
software did not and does not allow for the levels of platform
|
|
integration that now exist in schools."
|
|
|
|
In fact Mexico has gone into reverse with the Red Escolar (Schools
|
|
Network) project. This is due precisely to the fact that the driving
|
|
forces behind the Mexican project used license costs as their main
|
|
argument, instead of the other reasons specified in our project, which
|
|
are far more essential. Because of this conceptual mistake, and as a
|
|
result of the lack of effective support from the SEP (Secretary of
|
|
State for Public Education), the assumption was made that to implant
|
|
free software in schools it would be enough to drop their software
|
|
budget and send them a CD ROM with Gnu/Linux instead. Of course this
|
|
failed, and it couldn't have been otherwise, just as school
|
|
laboratories fail when they use proprietary software and have no
|
|
budget for implementation and maintenance. That's exactly why our bill
|
|
is not limited to making the use of free software mandatory, but
|
|
recognizes the need to create a viable migration plan, in which the
|
|
State undertakes the technical transition in an orderly way in order
|
|
to then enjoy the advantages of free software.
|
|
|
|
You end with a rhetorical question: "13. If open source software
|
|
satisfies all the requirements of State bodies, why do you need a law
|
|
to adopt it? Shouldn't it be the market which decides freely which
|
|
products give most benefits or value?"
|
|
|
|
We agree that in the private sector of the economy, it must be the
|
|
market that decides which products to use, and no state interference
|
|
is permissible there. However, in the case of the public sector, the
|
|
reasoning is not the same: as we have already established, the state
|
|
archives, handles, and transmits information which does not belong to
|
|
it, but which is entrusted to it by citizens, who have no alternative
|
|
under the rule of law. As a counterpart to this legal requirement, the
|
|
State must take extreme measures to safeguard the integrity,
|
|
confidentiality, and accessibility of this information. The use of
|
|
proprietary software raises serious doubts as to whether these
|
|
requirements can be fulfilled, lacks conclusive evidence in this
|
|
respect, and so is not suitable for use in the public sector.
|
|
|
|
The need for a law is based, firstly, on the realization of the
|
|
fundamental principles listed above in the specific area of software;
|
|
secondly, on the fact that the State is not an ideal homogeneous
|
|
entity, but made up of multiple bodies with varying degrees of
|
|
autonomy in decision making. Given that it is inappropriate to use
|
|
proprietary software, the fact of establishing these rules in law will
|
|
prevent the personal discretion of any state employee from putting at
|
|
risk the information which belongs to citizens. And above all, because
|
|
it constitutes an up-to-date reaffirmation in relation to the means of
|
|
management and communication of information used today, it is based on
|
|
the republican principle of openness to the public.
|
|
|
|
In conformance with this universally accepted principle, the citizen
|
|
has the right to know all information held by the State and not
|
|
covered by well- founded declarations of secrecy based on law. Now,
|
|
software deals with information and is itself information. Information
|
|
in a special form, capable of being interpreted by a machine in order
|
|
to execute actions, but crucial information all the same because the
|
|
citizen has a legitimate right to know, for example, how his vote is
|
|
computed or his taxes calculated. And for that he must have free
|
|
access to the source code and be able to prove to his satisfaction the
|
|
programs used for electoral computations or calculation of his taxes.
|
|
|
|
I wish you the greatest respect, and would like to repeat that my
|
|
office will always be open for you to expound your point of view to
|
|
whatever level of detail you consider suitable.
|
|
|
|
Cordially,
|
|
DR. EDGAR DAVID VILLANUEVA NUÑEZ
|
|
Congressman of the Republic of Perù.
|