151 lines
8.5 KiB
HTML
151 lines
8.5 KiB
HTML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<html newsdate="2026-07-28">
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<version>1</version>
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<head>
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<title>Google Android antitrust ruling shows the next battle is over who controls trust</title>
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</head>
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<body>
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<h1>Google Android Antitrust Ruling Shows the Next Battle is Over Who Controls Trust</h1>
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<p><strong>This text was originally published by <a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/google-android-antitrust-ruling-shows-the-next-battle-is-over-who-controls-trust/">Tech Policy Press</a> under <a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/google-android-antitrust-ruling-shows-the-next-battle-is-over-who-controls-trust/">CC BY-ND 4.0.</a></strong></p>
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<p>After eight years of litigation, Europe’s highest court has dismissed Google’s appeal, upholding the European Commission’s finding that Google used its control over Android to make its own search engine harder to avoid. But while that legal battle focused on contracts and market dominance, Google is now looking to shape how trust is established across the Android ecosystem.</p>
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<p>On July 2, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its
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final judgment in the Google Android antitrust case. The ruling made the
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penalty imposed by the General Court definitive. One of the most
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consequential technology competition disputes of the past decade, the
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case examined whether Google broke the law by using contractual
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restrictions, including anti-forking agreements, revenue-sharing
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arrangements, and tying practices, to preserve its dominance over the
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Android ecosystem and mobile search. The Court dismissed Google's
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appeal.</p>
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<p>Yet over these same eight years, Google has shifted how it maintains
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gatekeeper control. The latest iteration is the company's <a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2025/08/elevating-android-security.html">developer
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verification system</a>: starting in September 2026, developers
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worldwide who wish to distribute apps to certified Android devices will
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be required to agree to it.</p>
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<p>The timing is striking. While the Android antitrust case asked whether
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dominant platforms could preserve their power through contracts,
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Google's developer verification system points to something deeper: the
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next generation of platform control may operate through governance of
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trust itself.</p>
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<h3>Security claims and monopoly power</h3>
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<p>The pattern is familiar. Whenever a single firm has exercised control
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over a technological ecosystem, it has argued that greater openness
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threatens security. In the United States, the <a
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href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150120021035/http://www.uiowa.edu/~cyberlaw/FCCOps/1968/13F2-420.html">Bell
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System</a> argued that allowing third-party devices to connect to the
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telephone network would compromise its integrity and reliability. In the
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landmark 1968 <a
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href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150120021035/http://www.uiowa.edu/~cyberlaw/FCCOps/1968/13F2-420.html">Carterfone
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case</a>, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rejected a blanket
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prohibition on third-party devices, establishing that users could attach
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non-Bell devices as long as they did not harm the network. In 2007, <a
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href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carterfone"> Skype requested the US
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telecom regulator to apply the Carterfone case to the smartphone
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industry</a> to prohibit telecom operators from restricting end-users’
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freedom of choice regarding smartphones. This marked the beginning of
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net neutrality.</p>
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<p>In 2004, Microsoft argued before European competition authorities that
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disclosing interoperability information would undermine Windows'
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security architecture. The European bodies <a
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href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62004TJ0201">rejected
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security as a blanket justification</a> for refusing interoperability,
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even while acknowledging the underlying concerns were legitimate.</p>
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<p>Today, similar arguments continue to shape digital markets. Apple argues
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that the unfettered installation of apps (sideloading) and
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interoperability obligations under the Digital Markets Act (DMA)
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threaten the integrity and security of its systems. Before the Court of
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Justice of the European Union, Apple has argued that <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/563/oj/eng"> the DMA's
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interoperability obligations raise questions of proportionality</a>
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regarding <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/5213/oj/eng">fundamental
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rights</a>.</p>
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<p>With its developer verification, Google argues that unrestricted app
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distribution itself poses unacceptable risks to Android users. The use
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of <a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/google-and-apples-antidma-lobbying-strategy-goes-allin-on-security-and-privacy/">security
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arguments</a> to preserve control over technological systems is
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therefore hardly new and still as incorrect as it was in the past. The
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underlying security concerns may be real, but they do not necessarily
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justify centralized control by the incumbent where less restrictive and
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more interoperable alternatives are available.</p>
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<h3>Keeping control over the Android ecosystem: from contracts to trust</h3>
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<p>Android’s success was built on openness. Launched in 2007 as an
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open-source operating system, it offered manufacturers, developers and
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users more flexibility than competing platforms. The European
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Commission’s <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf">Android
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investigation</a> later revealed the tension at the heart of Google’s
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strategy, which sought to maintain control over an ecosystem whose
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appeal depended on appearing open.</p>
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<p>The investigation culminated in a landmark 2018 decision finding Google
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in violation of EU competition law. Google appealed to the Court of
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Justice of the EU, which recognized that digital ecosystems cannot be
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understood through traditional market definitions alone. They require a
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"multi-level" and "multi-directional" analysis, since products,
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services, developers, manufacturers, and consumers interact across
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interconnected platforms.</p>
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<p>That case closed only weeks ago, but it wasn't the only one before the
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Courts in recent years. Another case, involving the Android Auto app,
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shows how Google increasingly relies on ecosystem and interoperability
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control rather than contracts alone. <a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/interoperability-in-the-eu-a-judgment-opens-the-door/">The
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CJEU examined interoperability questions</a> referred by an Italian
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court in the dispute over an EV-charging app. Google had refused to make
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the app interoperable with Android Auto, citing security concerns and
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the absence of a specific template for EV-charging apps, since the
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available templates were limited to categories such as messaging and
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media apps.</p>
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<p>The Court found that although Google hadn't prohibited the app's
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distribution, control over competitors' participation in a digital
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ecosystem can itself be a source of market power: decisions about who
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may access a platform, when, and under what technical conditions can
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shape competition as much as contracts do.</p>
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<p>Together, the two cases illustrate different generations of platform control:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><bold>First generation</bold>: control through contracts (the Android antitrust case)</li>
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<li><bold>Second generation</bold>: control through ecosystem governance and interoperability (the Android Auto case)</li>
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</ul>
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<h3>Who controls trust on Android?</h3>
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<p>Android revolutionized the mobile market by being under a Free Software
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license: anyone could run, install, distribute, and develop software,
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including alternative versions of Android itself. This vision of Android
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as a general-purpose computing platform is reflected in initiatives such
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as the Free Software Foundation Europe's "<a href="/activities/android/android.html">Free Your Android</a>,” which
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advocates for users' freedom to install alternative operating systems
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and apps on devices they own.</p>
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<p>This openness distinguished Android from competing mobile operating
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systems. Developers could distribute apps through commercial app stores,
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community repositories, direct downloads, enterprise channels, or other
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mechanisms, while users retained the freedom to decide which apps to
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trust. This model enabled alternative app stores, custom operating
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systems, and developer communities to be independent of Google.</p>
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</body>
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<tags>
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<tag key="deviceneutrality">Device Neutrality</tag>
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<tag key="fya">Free Your Android</tag>
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</tags>
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<image url="https://pics.fsfe.org/uploads/medium/53/e1/dbab450c6284ac9ec94d85fbafce.jpg" alt="An illustration about the right to repair"/>
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